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Torts
by Deron R. Hicks*
and Travis C. Hargrove**
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2008 and May 31, 2009.1
I.

DEFAMATION

Fitzgerald,2

In Gettner v.
the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed each
of the elements of defamation, including the purported "opinion"
exception,3 and addressed whether an individual was a public or private
figure for purposes of the standard of liability for a publisher.4 In 1999
Mark Gettner went to work at Fitzgerald & Company (F&C), an
advertising agency, as a group creative director leading one of the
company's creative teams. In 2001 Jim Paddock, then-executive creative
director of F&C, retired. Gettner was promoted to Paddock's previous
position, effective April 2001.' In July 2002 Gettner decided to leave
the executive creative director position because he "did not 'want to deal
with all the nuances that were not part of the creative process,' such as
hiring and managing subordinates. Gettner claimed that he discussed
* General Counsel, Home Builders Association of Georgia. Adjunct Professor, Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law. University of Georgia (B.FA., 1990); Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1991-1993); Senior Managing Editor (1992-1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. Auburn University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, Mercer Law Review (20022004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
1. For analysis of Georgia tort law during the prior survey period, see Deron R. Hicks
& Travis C. Hargrove, Torts, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 375
(2008).
2. 297 Ga. App. 258, 677 S.E.2d 149 (2009).
3. Id. at 260-61, 677 S.E.2d at 153-54.
4. Id. at 262-63, 677 S.E.2d at 154-55.
5. Id. at 259, 677 S.E.2d at 152.
6. Id.
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this decision with David Fitzgerald, F&C's chief executive officer, and
Fitzgerald agreed to allow Gettner to return to his former position.7
Fitzgerald claimed that he initiated a meeting with Gettner, telling
Gettner he would be demoted because Gettner's subordinates were not
producing work of a high enough quality under Gettner's leadership.'
Fitzgerald proposed that he would allow Gettner to "save face" by
allowing the decision to be presented jointly as if it had been Gettner's
choice.' Gettner's salary was reduced, and a form was submitted to
F&C's human resources department which stated that Gettner's salary
was being changed because Gettner had "'stepped down' to the position
of [giroup [cireative [dJirector." 0
In an e-mail sent to all F&C employees in July 2002, Fitzgerald stated
that Gettner was returning to his previous position "'to be closer to the
[creative] work.'"11 In August 2002 Fitzgerald e-mailed Alicia Griswold, a reporter for VNU Business Media, Inc.'s advertising trade
publication, AdWeek, and asked if she "knew of any good executive
creative directors because Gettner had 'stepped down. ' " 12 Griswold,
skeptical that Gettner's demotion was his own choice, asked Fitzgerald
for the real story behind the demotion. 3 Fitzgerald told Griswold that
Gettner "lacked the qualities an executive director needed" and that
Gettner was demoted for "poor performance." 4
In March 2003, as part of a workforce reduction, F&C terminated
Gettner.'6 In April 2003 AdWeek released its "Agency Report Cards,"
an annual rating of the ten largest advertising agencies in the southeast
region in numerous categories. 6 AdWeek gave F&C an overall grade
of "C," and the "Management" section of the rating included a comment
that "'CEO Dave Fitzgerald demoted [Executive Creative Director] Mark
Gettner [in 2002] after poor performance; retired [Executive Creative
Director] Jim Paddock started weekly visits "to help" creative.'" 7
Griswold did not verify this information with Gettner before publishing
the article that included this information, claiming that "she did not
need to call Gettner to verify Fitzgerald's statement that Gettner had

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 259-60, 677 S.E.2d at 152-53.
Id. at 260, 677 S.E.2d at 153.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
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been demoted for poor performance because she 'had a fact' from the
head of the agency.""8 Griswold also claimed that "an advertising
consultant told her that he had seen a pitch for an account that Gettner
made on behalf of F&C that was 'weak,'" thus confirming to her that
Gettner was performing his job duties in a substandard manner.19
After the report was published, Fitzgerald asked Griswold why she
printed the information he asked her not to print.20 Griswold told
Fitzgerald "'don't ever tell a reporter anything you don't want to see in
Gettner stated that "he confronted Griswold about the
print."'2
[article] and she admitted that she knew he had actually stepped down
voluntarily."'
Gettner sued VNU (Griswold's employer) for defamation and F&C and
Fitzgerald for invasion of privacy based on Fitzgerald's conversation with
Griswold and F&C's "alleged appropriation of Gettner's name and
likeness."' All defendants moved for summary judgment, and the trial
court granted the motions.' The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's ruling with respect to the grant of summary judgment to VNU on
the defamation claim.'
Gettner contended that a jury issue existed with respect to each
essential element of his defamation claim against VNU. 26 Gettner's
complaint was premised upon section 51-5-2(a) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 27 and the court evaluated each of the
four elements necessary to prove a cause of action under that statute.28

18.
19.

Id.
Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 258, 677 S.E.2d at 152. This Article will focus on the defamation claim, and
the invasion of privacy claim will not be addressed herein.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 260, 677 S.E.2d at 153.
27. O.C.G.A. § 51-5-2(a) (2000). The statute states, "Any false and malicious
defamation of another in any newspaper, magazine, or periodical, tending to injure the
reputation of the person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, shall
constitute a newspaper libel." Id.
28. Gettner, 297 Ga. App. at 260, 677 S.E.2d at 153. The court noted that the four
elements of a claim for defamation are: (1) "the defendant's publication of a defamatory
statement about the plaintiff," (2) "the falsity of the defamatory statement," (3) "the
defendant's fault in publishing it," and (4) "the plaintiffs actual injury from the statement."
Id. (citing Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 20-21, 573 S.E.2d 376, 380 (2002)).
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First, the court looked at whether VNU published a defamatory
statement about Gettner.29 While it was not disputed that "VNU
published the report about Gettner and that such a report would tend
to injure Gettner's reputation and expose him to public contempt or
ridicule," VNU contended that "whether Gettner's performance was poor
is a matter of opinion and, therefore, that its report about Gettner was
not an actionable statement of fact."" The court disagreed, noting that
although "a defamation action will lie only for a statement of fact[,]" and
not one that "reflects an opinion or subjective assessment, as to which
reasonable minds could differ [and which] cannot be proved false," there
is no wholesale exception to defamation for opinions. 1 In fact, "'an
opinion can constitute actionable defamation if the opinion can
reasonably be interpreted, according to the context of the entire writing
in which the opinion appears, to state or imply defamatory facts about
the plaintiff that are capable of being proved false.' 32 Accordingly, to
the extent VNU's statement could be proven false, it could constitute a
defamatory statement.3 3 Therefore, the court held that if Gettner could
prove that Fitzgerald demoted him for something other than unsatisfactory performance, the statement was capable of being proven false, and
VNU could not avoid liability by labeling the statement "opinion. " '
Therefore, because an issue of fact (whether Gettner was demoted due
to poor performance) remained with respect to whether VNU published
a defamatory statement about Gettner, summary judgment was
improper.3" The same disputed fact prevented summary judgment on
the issue of whether the allegedly defamatory statement was false.36
VNU next contended that "Gettner identified no evidence of fault,
either under the malice standard that applies to public figures or under
the negligence standard that applies to private figures."37 Noting that
the issue of whether Gettner was a public or private figure was a
question of law for the court, the court held that Gettner was not a
public figure or a limited-purpose public figure.38 The court noted that
there was no "public controversy" with regard to VNU's report regarding

29. Id. at 261, 677 S.E.2d at 153.
30. Id.
31. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 153-54.
32. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 154 (quoting Gast v. Brittain, 277 Ga. 340, 341, 589 S.E.2d 63,
64 (2003)).
33. Id. at 261-62, 677 S.E.2d at 154.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 262, 677 S.E.2d at 154.
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id. at 263-64, 677 S.E.2d at 154-55.
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Gettner's demotion because there was "no evidence in the record that the
issue of the reasons for Gettner's change in employment status could
have any substantial ramifications for anyone other than him and his
immediate family."39 Accordingly, Gettner needed only to demonstrate
VNU acted with ordinary negligence. 0
The court next addressed the standard of care owed to Gettner, a
private figure, by VNU. The standard of care in such a case
will be defined by reference to the procedures a reasonable publisher
in [its] position would have employed prior to publishing [an item] such
as [the] one [at issue. A publisher] will be held to the skill and
experience normally exercised by members of [its] profession. Custom
in the trade is relevant but not controlling. 42
Under that standard, the court held that a jury issue existed as to
whether VNU was negligent in publishing the defamatory statement
The court noted that "Griswold had an ample
about Gettner.'
opportunity ...

to conduct a more thorough investigation of the

circumstances of Gettner's demotion[,]" especially because Fitzgerald's
e-mail to the company about Gettner contradicted what he told Griswold
about Gettner's demotion and because Fitzgerald had asked Griswold not
to publish the information regarding Gettner's demotion. 4 Furthermore, the court held that a jury could have found Griswold breached the
applicable standard of care by failing to attempt to verify, through any
third-party, the circumstances of Gettner's demotion.4 5 Because of all
the existing jury issues, the court of appeals reversed the grant of
summary judgment on Gettner's defamation claim. 46

39. Id. at 264, 677 S.E.2d at 155. The fact that a controversy or disagreement of a
private nature may become public or that it may attract attention does not make it a public
controversy. See id. at 263, 677 S.E.2d at 155. Rather, to be a public controversy, it must

receive public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct
participants. See id.
40. Id. at 264, 677 S.E.2d at 155.
41. Id.
42. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 155-56 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, 181,317 S.E.2d 534, 537
(1984)).
43. Id. at 265, 677 S.E.2d at 156.

44. Id.
45. Id.

46. Id. at 266, 677 S.E.2d at 157.
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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In Blue View Corp. v. Bell,47 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
emotional distress claims in the context of an alleged wrongful foreclosure.' Yolanda and Wesley Bell sued Blue View Corporation, claiming
intentional infliction of emotional distress after Blue View initiated
foreclosure proceedings on the Bells' home. Blue View failed to answer
the complaint, and a default judgment was entered against it. A hearing
was held on damages, and a judgment was entered against Blue View
for $2 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive
damages. 49 Blue View moved to set aside the default judgment,
arguing that "it did not receive notice of the final judgment and did not
receive timely notice of the hearing on damages."5 ° The trial court
found that "Blue View did not receive notice of the final judgment but
did receive notice of the hearing"; thus, the motion to set aside was
granted.5 1 However, the trial court then reentered the same judgment,
including the damages award. Blue View appealed on multiple grounds,
including that the trial court erred in entering the default judgment.5 2
One year after purchasing real property, in May 2000 the Bells
obtained a home equity line of credit and loan in the amount of $67,000
from Bank One. The Bells fell into arrears on the loan and filed for
bankruptcy.' At that point, it was alleged that "the Bells 'entered into
good faith negotiations with Defendant Bank One to establish a payoff
amount of the loan.'"5 4 In May 2004 Bank One assigned the loan to
Blue View. Six months later, Bank One accepted $4500 from the Bells
as final payment on the loan. In February 2005 Blue View initiated
foreclosure proceedings, which were later withdrawn. Blue View then
assigned the loan to Stewart Title, which foreclosed on the property and
later sold it at auction.55
Based on the above averments, the Bells made several claims against
Stewart Title and Bank One, including wrongful foreclosure, slander of
title, fraud, failure to cancel instrument of record, and conversion.
However, the Bells only sued Blue View for intentional infliction of

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

298 Ga. App. 277, 679 S.E.2d 739 (2009).
Id. at 277, 679 S.E.2d at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277-78, 679 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 278, 679 S.E.2d at 740-41.
Id., 679 S.E.2d at 741.
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emotional distress. Blue View contended that the trial court erred in
granting a default judgment against Blue View because, even admitting
the factual allegations of the complaint, as is required in the default
judgment context, the facts alleged in the complaint did not state a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Blue View."
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
court noted a plaintiff must show that "'(1) the conduct giving rise to the
claim was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the
emotional distress was severe."'5 Furthermore,
[t]he defendant's conduct must be so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Whether a claim rises to
the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of
law.5
With respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against Blue View, the Bells alleged that Blue View "'recklessly,
wantonly and with extreme indifference to the consequences ignore[d]
the facts of the case that the debt had been paid,' that Blue View
'instituted foreclosure proceeding[s] against the [Bells],' and that 'upon
information and belief the foreclosure was withdrawn by Blue View.' 59
Although noting that "'an intentional wrongful foreclosure can be the
basis for an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,' ° the
court observed that the only facts admitted by virtue of Blue View's
default were that it initiated foreclosure proceedings but withdrew the
proceedings prior to assigning the loan to Stewart Title.61 Therefore,
any wrongful foreclosure was conducted by Stewart Title and not Blue
View.62 Accordingly, the court held that as a matter of law, based on
the conclusory allegations in the complaint, it could not be said that "the
acts of Blue View were extreme and outrageous or that the Bells'
emotional distress was 'so severe that no reasonable man could be

56. Id. at 277-78, 679 S.E.2d at 740-41.

57. Id. at 279, 679 S.E.2d at 741 (quoting Frank v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 238 Ga. App. 316,
318, 518 S.E.2d 717, 720 (1999)).
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frank, 238 Ga. App. at 318, 518

S.E.2d at 720).
59. Id., 679 S.E.2d at 741-42 (alterations in original).
60. Id., 679 S.E.2d at 742 (quoting Ingram v. JIK Realty Co., 199 Ga. App. 335, 337,
404 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1991)).

61. Id. at 279-81, 679 S.E.2d at 742.
62. Id. at 280, 679 S.E.2d at 742.
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expected to endure it.'"' As the court noted, the fact that the foreclosure was withdrawn before completion differentiated the present case
from DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing,' in which a foreclosure
proceeded even though
the defendant had been told it was foreclosing on
65
the wrong property.
In today's economic climate and with the number of foreclosures
taking place, security interest holders can take some respite from the
decision in Blue View. If they make an error which could possibly
constitute a wrongful foreclosure, but they do not act maliciously in
initiating the proceedings and quickly rectify the error, then they can
potentially avoid liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In Abdul-Malik v. AirTran Airways, Inc.,6 Mahmoud Abdul-Malik
sued his former employer, AirTran Airways, Inc., several AirTran
employees with supervisory authority over Abdul-Malik, the manager of
System Baggage Service, an individual who worked for All-N-1 Security
Services, Inc. (All-N-i), and an Atlanta Police Department detective
assigned to the airport station. Abdul-Malik was hired by AirlIran on
January 16, 2004, to work as a ramp agent at Hartsfield-Jackson
International Airport. In August 2005 AirTran began to experience
increased complaints regarding theft of checked baggage. As a result of
the complaints, AirTran contracted with All-N-1 to investigate the
6
incidentsY.
Charles West, All-N-l's investigator, deposed that he
received a call from an unidentified male on November 11, 2005, who
"accused West of 'messing with' the caller's buddies and threatened to
blow up West's house." 8 The caller identification device indicated
the
69
call was made from AirTran's general number at the airport.

While working as an undercover All-N-1 operative who also worked as
an AirTran employee, Charles Carter overheard Abdul-Malik admit to
a co-worker that he made the call. Carter reported the information in
an e-mail to Chana Rogers, All-N-is human resources manager.7 °

63. Id. (quoting Ingram, 199 Ga. App. at 337, 404 S.E.2d at 805).
64. 291 Ga. App. 444, 662 S.E.2d 141 (2008).
65. Blue View, 298 Ga. App. at 280, 679 S.E.2d at 742 (citing DeGolyer, 291 Ga. App.
at 449-50, 662 S.E.2d at 148).
66. 297 Ga. App. 852, 678 S.E.2d 555 (2009).
67. Id. at 852-53, 678 S.E.2d at 556-57.
68. Id. at 853, 678 S.E.2d at 557.
69. Id.
70. Id. More specifically, the e-mail from Carter stated that
while sitting in the office with a number of other employees waiting for a plane
to arrive, [he] heard Abdul-Malik say to James Hegarty, another ramp agent, "I
am going to find out where Mr. West lives and I am going to blow his house up for
what he did to Sixty-Nine." Hegarty then asked who West was and what he did
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According to Abdul-Malik, on November 30, 2005, an AirTran manager
came to the place where Abdul-Malik was working and took him to
Stanley Whitehead's (a defendant who had overall responsibility for
Airlran's operations, employees, and assets in Atlanta) office where
Detective Calvin Cole (another defendant) and AirTran employee
Michael Brown were also present. Whitehead told Abdul-Malik that
Airlran was investigating terroristic threats made to West. AbdulMalik claimed that Whitehead asked if he was Muslim, and Abdul-Malik
stated he was. Whitehead next asked if Abdul-Malik knew West, and
Abdul-Malik indicated that he did not. Allegedly, Cole then said that he
could see Abdul-Malik's heart beating through his chest and that he was
guilty. Cole then allegedly called Abdul-Malik a liar and a terrorist. At
that point, Abdul-Malik asked for a lawyer and was not questioned any
further. Abdul-Malik was informed he would be suspended with pay
until an investigaton was completed. Ultimately, Abdul-Malik was
terminated for making a false statement during the investigation.7 '
The defendants all moved for summary judgment on Abdul-Malik's
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the motions
were granted. Abdul-Malik appealed, alleging that all the defendants
were involved in a conspiracy to fabricate the e-mail to Rogers and that
the conspiracy caused him emotional distress.7 The court of appeals
dispensed with this argument quickly, noting that Abdul-Malik had not
come forward with any evidence to dispute the fact that the e-mail was
sent to Rogers by Carter, and the court characterized his fabrication
theory as "rampant speculation.""3 Abdul-Malik's remaining allegations
centered on the conduct of the defendants during the November 30, 2005
meeting.7 4
The court explained,
lb recover on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a
plaintiff must show evidence that: (1) [the] defendants' conduct was
intentional or reckless; (2) [the] defendants' conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) a causal connection existed between the wrongful
conduct75and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional harm was
severe.

to Sixty-Nine. Abdul-Malik responded that West "tries to get people fired for no
reason.... I called his ass to scare him but he hung up on me."
Id. (ellipses in original).
71. Id. at 853-54, 678 S.E.2d at 557.
72. Id. at 855, 678 S.E.2d at 558.
73. Id. at 857, 678 S.E.2d at 559.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 855-56, 678 S.E.2d at 558-59.
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The court held that the conduct of the defendants at the November 30,
2005 meeting "did not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous. ' ""
The court observed that some of the defendants did not attend the
meeting, and of those attending, Brown did not speak." Further, the
court noted that "Carter's e-mail gave Whitehead reasonable grounds to
investigate whether Abdul-Malik made a terroristic threat using an
AirTran telephone while he was on duty."78
The court acknowledged, according to Abdul-Malik, that Whitehead
asked Abdul-Malik if he was a Muslim, and Detective Cole accused
Abdul-Malik of being a liar and terrorist. 79 However, Abdul-Malik was
not held or detained.'
Further, the court observed that comments
made in the context of one's employment, including false accusations of
dishonesty, are considered "'common vicissitude[s] of ordinary life'" even
if horrifying or traumatizing."' Accordingly, the court concluded that
the conduct of Whitehead and Cole did not exceed the bounds of what
was acceptable within the normal bounds 8tolerated
by society, and such
2
conduct was not extreme and outrageous.
The court also noted that Abdul-Malik failed to produce evidence of
the fourth element of intentional infliction of emotional distress-that
the harm was "severe.'
Noting that this was a question for the court
to decide, the court observed that Abdul-Malik alleged he could not sleep
after the meeting and eventually gained fifteen pounds but that he did
not take medication or seek any professional help.' The court held
that sleeplessness and weight gain were "not so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure them."' Because Abdul-Malik
had failed to present evidence of severe emotional distress, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment.o

76. Id. at 857, 678 S.E.2d at 559.
77.

Id.

78. Id.

79. Id., 678 S.E.2d at 559-60.
80. Id., 678 S.E.2d at 560.
81. Id. (quoting Jarrard v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 242 Ga. App. 58, 59, 529 S.E.2d
144, 147 (2000)).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 858, 678 S.E.2d at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
87
Austin, the Georgia Supreme

In Moreland v.
Court addressed the
issue of whether, in a medical malpractice case, the Privacy Rules
promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA)' precludes a defendant's attorney from informally
interviewing a plaintiff's prior treating physicians."
The court
determined that it does.91
The plaintiff, Amanda Moreland, brought a medical malpractice action
against Dr. Michael Austin in the State Court of Bibb County after the
death of her husband, Jimmy Lee Moreland. The plaintiff produced her
husband's medical records, which included documents pertaining to prior
physicians who treated her husband.' After receipt of these records,
the defendant's attorney contacted the previous treating physicians "and
asked them to assess Mr. Moreland's 'cardiovascular status and his
prognosis. ' "93 The plaintiff objected to these contacts and asserted that
the contacts violated HIPAA. The trial court disagreed, and the plaintiff
dismissed the state court case and re-filed in superior court.9 The
plaintiff sought, in addition to her medical malpractice claim, an
injunction preventing the defense lawyers from "'inducing any healthcare provider to divulge protected health information concerning [Mr.]
Moreland' except in compliance with HIPAA."9 The injunctive relief
was granted, and the trial court ruled that the defense lawyers could not
interview Mr. Moreland's prior treating physicians unless they gave the
plaintiff notice so that her attorneys could be present during the
interviews.9
The defendant appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that "as long as a physician discloses protected
health information in compliance with HIPAA and Georgia law, defense
counsel can continue to communicate with the physician in an ex parte
fashion."9 7 The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court

87.

284 Ga. 730, 670 S.E.2d 68 (2008).

88.

45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2008).

89. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 11 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.).

90. Moreland, 284 Ga. at 730, 670 S.E.2d at 69.
91. Id.
92.

Id.

93. Id.
94.

Id.

95. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 69-70 (alteration in original).
96.
97.

Id., 670 S.E.2d at 70.
Id.
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"to determine whether [the] plaintiff consented to the disclosure of Mr.
Moreland's protected health information prior to April 14, 2003 (the
effective date of the HIPAA privacy provisions)," which would determine
whether the meetings with the prior treating physicians could take
place.9"
The Georgia Supreme Court noted that HIPAA was enacted by
Congress to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of patients'
medical information. 9 The court observed that one of the regulations
promulgated under HIPAA authorizes disclosure of information "'in the
course of any judicial... proceeding' either in response to an order of a
court or in response to a subpoena, a request for discovery, 'or other
lawful process.'"'" Moreover, another regulation provides that if a
patient signs a valid authorization, disclosure is authorized.01
Without the patient's consent, the healthcare provider
cannot disclose protected health information unless it receives "satisfactory assurance ... that reasonable efforts have been made [either] (A)
...to ensure that the individual who is the subject of the [requested]
protected health information ... has been given notice of the request"
and an opportunity to object or "(B)... to secure a qualified protective
order" prohibiting the litigants from disclosing the information outside
of the proceeding and requiring the destruction or return of the
information following the termination of the proceeding."°
At that point, the healthcare provider can choose to provide the
requested information, but it must take reasonable precautions "to
ensure that it only discloses the 'minimum necessary' to accomplish the
intended purpose of the disclosure." 103
The court of appeals had held that HIPAA did not preclude ex parte
communications between defense counsel and prior treating physicians,
reasoning that the Georgia Civil Practice Act' °4 placed more stringent
requirements than HIPAA on requests for documents from a third-party
healthcare provider; thus O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34105 was not preempted by
HIPAA.'" The supreme court disagreed with this analysis, noting

98. Id.

99. Id. at 731, 670 S.E.2d at 70.
100. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1) (2008)).
101. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) (2008)).
102. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(eXlXii)-(v)).

103. Id. at 731-32, 670 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting 45 C.F.R § 164.508 (2008)).
104. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -133 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
105. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34 (2006).
106. Moreland, 284 Ga. at 732, 670 S.E.2d at 71.
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that the issue was not whether the evidence was discoverable, but rather
the method of discovery."°
The supreme court noted that a plaintiff waives his right to privacy
regarding medical conditions that are placed in issue in a civil or
criminal proceeding"° and that Georgia law allows a defendant to seek
the plaintiffs protected health information by formal discovery or by
communicating with the plaintiff's treating physicians."° However,
the court held that "HIPAA preempts Georgia law with regard to ex
parte communications between defense counsel and plaintiff's prior
treating physicians."1
The court reasoned that "HIPAA affords
patients more control over their medical records when it comes to
informal contacts between litigants and physicians" because HIPAA
prevents a medical provider from discussing a patient's medical
condition in litigation without a court order, the patient's consent, or
through other procedural means.1
Although a defense lawyer may not seek medical information, a
defense lawyer may still contact a prior treating physician without
consent to make inquiries regarding benign topics such as the best
methods of serving a subpoena and determining dates for trial testimony
or a deposition. 12 Accordingly, if a defense lawyer wants to interview
a plaintiff's treating physician, the lawyer must obtain an authorization
from the plaintiff or otherwise comply with HIPAA.1 3 Consent to
contact a physician ex parte shall not be implied by the lack of an
objection to a subpoena for production of medical records.'
The court noted that the penalty for violations of HIPAA should be
determined by the trial court but recommended that an extreme sanction
is inappropriate for contacts made prior to its decision in Moreland
because the applicability of HIPAA to these ex parte communications
was uncertain." 5

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
708 (D.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 24-9-40(a) (1995 & Supp. 2009)).
Id.
Id. at 733, 670 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
Id. at 733-34, 670 S.E.2d at 72 (citing Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705,
Md. 2004)).
Id. at 734, 670 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 735, 670 S.E.2d at 73.
Id. at 734, 670 S.E.2d at 72.
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IV. NEGLIGENCE
In 7Ims v. Hasselberger,"6 the mother of sixteen-year-old Greg Wade
Murray sued Frances and Michael Tims after Murray died from
consuming methadone and alcohol at a party hosted by the Timses' son
while the Timses were out of town. The Timses moved for summary
judgment, arguing that there was no evidence of negligence, and the
trial court denied the motion." 7 The Georgia Court of Appeals granted
an application for interlocutory
appeal and reversed the denial of
8
summary judgment."1
The Timses were out of town for the weekend on May 14-15, 2005.
Before they left, Mrs. Tims told Justin Tims, her seventeen-year-old son,
not to stay at their house, invite anyone over, or have any parties at the
house while his parents were out of town. Justin told his mother that
he would stay with either his friend or his employer, and he told his
father that he would stay with a friend." 9
While his parents were out of town, Justin hosted a party at his
parents' house, and Greg Murray attended. During the party, another
guest, Adam Pennington, sold Murray three methadone pills. Murray
died that night after consuming the pills
and alcohol that was brought
20
to the house by various party guests.
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
submitted an affidavit from Pennington, which stated that on one
occasion he had seen Justin take drinks from his father's beer bottle
without objection.' 21 The affidavit also stated that on May 14, 2005,
after Mr. Tims told Justin he was going out of town, Justin replied
"Good, now I can throw a party." 12 2 Mr. Tims responded, "Just don't
get too wild or get the police called out here."' 23 Another person stated
in an affidavit that he saw Justin use marijuana in front of his father.
Evidence was also submitted to show that before Murray died, Justin
12 4
had consumed alcohol, marijuana, and methadone multiple times.
Justin deposed that he consumed methadone, which was provided by
Pennington (the same person who provided the methadone to Murray at

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

298 Ga. App. 256, 679 S.E.2d 731 (2009).
Id. at 256, 679 S.E.2d at 732.
Id.
Id. at 257, 679 S.E.2d at 732.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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the party), for the first time approximately two weeks prior to the party.
Justin testified that he and Murray had consumed methadone on
approximately five to ten prior occasions. No evidence was submitted
that the Timses knew of Murray's methadone use. Justin also testified
that the Timses had to retrieve him from a police station after he and
a friend were caught with unopened beer in their vehicle on a prior
occasion, that he had been previously arrested and served a week in jail,
and that he was on house arrest for six to nine months as a result.' 25
The Timses argued that there was no evidence they could have
foreseen that Murray would attend a party at their home while they
were not present and that he would voluntarily ingest prescription drugs
sold to him by a third-party. Therefore, according12to the Timses, they
could not be held civilly liable for Murray's death.
Noting that in Georgia, "'parents are not liable in damages for the
torts of their minor children merely because of the parent-child
relationship,'"'2 7 the court stated that "'[rlecovery has been permitted
[when] there was some parental negligence in furnishing or permitting
a child access to an instrumentality with which the child likely would
injure a third party.'"'" Further, the court stated, "[when], as here 'the
parent did not furnish the dangerous instrumentality but through
negligence allowed access thereto to the child, the standard for imposing
liability upon a parent ... is whether the parent knew of the child's
proclivity or propensity for the specific dangerous activity.' ' 29
The court observed that the evidence in this case showed that the
Timses knew Justin had consumed alcohol and marijuana prior to
leaving him home alone, that he had been arrested previously for
delinquency, and that he had previously been arrested for having an
unopened beer in his car.13 Furthermore, there was evidence Justin
told his father that he was going to have a party in his parents'
absence.' 3' On the other hand, the court noted that the Timses did not
supply methadone or alcohol at the party, and no evidence showed that
the Timses knew their son had previously consumed methadone.132
Finally, the court emphasized that the Timses did not have reason to

125. Id. at 257-58, 679 S.E.2d at 732-33.
126. Id., 679 S.E.2d at 733.
127. Id. (quoting McNamee v. A.J.W., 238 Ga. App. 534, 535, 519 S.E.2d 298, 301

(1999)).
128.
129.
at 433,
130.
131.

Id. (quoting Saenz v. Andrus, 195 Ga. App. 431, 433, 393 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1990)).
Id. at 258--59, 679 S.E.2d at 733 (ellipses in original) (quoting Saenz, 195 Ga. App.
393 S.E.2d at 726).
Id. at 259, 679 S.E.2d at 734.
Id.

132. Id.
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anticipate Justin would host a party at their home where an individual
would illegally sell methadone to another person who would ultimately
die."' 3 Therefore, the Timses had no duty to guard against such a
scenario.'34
The court held that it does not "'place a duty on parents to arrange for
supervision of their teenagers while ... away from home'"; 35 rather,
parental liability is "'limited to such instances where the parent has
taken some active part in the creation of the danger.'""' However,
failure to supervise does not rise to that level of taking an active part in
the creation of the danger.137 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.'38
V. PREMISES LIABILrrY

In Jarrellv. JDC & Associates, LLC, 13 the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of a development
company after the plaintiff, an employee of BellSouth Communications,
was injured on the defendant's property while in the course of inspecting
work performed by a vendor of BellSouth. 40 While inspecting the
vendor's work, the plaintiff fell after stepping into a hole that was
allegedly covered by wheat straw. The plaintiff subsequently brought
suit against the defendants. During the course of discovery, the plaintiff
admitted that he had been on worksites in which wheat straw had been
used for erosion control purposes. The defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was a licensee, not an
invitee, and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because there was no evidence of willful or wanton acts. The trial
court granted the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff
appealed.14 1 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. 4 '
The plaintiff argued on appeal that he was an invitee on the defendant's premises, not a licensee, and that the defendant therefore had a
duty "to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches

133.
134.
135.
136.
(1999)).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 259-60, 679 S.E.2d at 734.
at 260, 679 S.E.2d at 734.
(quoting McNamee, 238 Ga. App. at 536, 519 S.E.2d at 301).
(quoting Stewart v. Harvard, 239 Ga. App. 388, 396, 520 S.E.2d 752, 759

Id.
Id.
296 Ga. App. 523, 675 S.E.2d 278 (2009).
Id. at 523, 675 S.E.2d at 279.
Id. at 523-24, 675 S.E.2d at 279-80.
Id. at 524, 675 S.E.2d at 280.
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safe. " "'
The court of appeals disagreed.""
distinguished an invitee from a licensee:

The court of appeals

The accepted test to determine whether one is an invitee or a
licensee is whether the party coming onto the business premises had
present business relations with the owner or occupier which would
render his presence of mutual benefit to both, or whether his presence
was for his own convenience, or was for business with one other than
the owner or occupier."4
The court noted that there was no evidence that the defendant even
knew the plaintiff was on the property.146 Moreover, "the purpose of
[the plaintiff's] visit was connected to BellSouth's business with its
vendors, not business with the landowner, which confers upon [the
plaintiff] the status of licensee rather than invitee." 47 Although a
property owner "owes a duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary care to
keep the premises and approaches safe,"' the "duty to a licensee is
not to injure the licensee wantonly or willfully and 'arises after the
owner becomes aware of or should anticipate the presence of the licensee
near the peril.'"149 Further, the court noted that "'[tlo the licensee, as
to the trespasser, no duty arises of keeping the usual condition of the
premises up to any given standard of safety, except that they must not
contain pitfalls, man-traps, and things of that character.'"' 5 Because
the record did not contain any evidence that the defendant "wilfully and
wantonly injured [the plaintiff] or ...created a mantrap or pitfall,"' 5 '
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. 5 '
In Cocklin v. JC Penney Corp.,' the court of appeals held in a tripand-fall case that although the plaintiff had traversed the alleged hazard
on several occasions prior to her fall, an issue of fact existed about
whether the plaintiff was aware of the "specific hazard" that caused her

143. Id. at 524-25, 675 S.E.2d at 280.
144. Id. at 524, 675 S.E.2d at 280.
145. Id. at 525, 675 S.E.2d at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MooreSapp Investors v. Richards, 240 Ga. App. 798, 799, 522 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1999)).
146. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 281.
147. Id.
148. Id., 675 S.E.2d at 280.
149. Id. (quoting Bartlett v. Mallet, 247 Ga. App. 749,750, 545 S.E.2d 329,331 (2001)).
150. Id. at 526, 675 S.E.2d at 281 (quoting Francis v. Haygood Contracting, Inc., 199
Ga. App. 74, 75, 404 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1991)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 527, 675 S.E.2d at 282.
153. 296 Ga. App. 179, 674 S.E.2d 48 (2009).
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fall, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of the defendant." The plaintiff fell and was injured as she was entering the hair
salon at the JC Penney store in LaGrange, Georgia. The plaintiff
brought suit against JC Penney, alleging that the defendant knew or
should have known that the offset transition from the JC Penney store
into the hair salon constituted a hazard.15 On motion for summary
judgment, however, the defendant argued that "the alleged hazard that
caused [the plaintiff's] fall was a static condition that she had successfully negotiated before and that had caused no prior accidents."156 The
trial court granted the defendant's motion.' 57 On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed. 158
The record in the case indicated that the plaintiff had been to the hair
The court of
salon on numerous prior occasions without incident.'
appeals, however, noted "that the rule imputing knowledge of a danger
to a person who has successfully negotiated it before applies only to
cases involving a static condition that is 'readily discernible' to a person
exercising reasonable care for his own safety." "6 Because the plaintiff
had testified that she did not notice the elevated edge of the transition
6
"until conducting a close, visual and tactile inspection of the area"' '
the day following her accident, the court held that a material issue of
fact existed as to whether the "specific hazard" that allegedly caused the
plaintiff to fall "was readily observable to her in the exercise of ordinary
care and
whether she [could] therefore be presumed to have knowledge
162
of it."

154. Id. at 182, 674 S.E.2d at 51.

155. Id. at 180, 674 S.E.2d at 49-50. The offset transition is described by the court of
appeals as follows:

[Tihe floor transitions from a lower, horizontal surface composed of vinyl tiles to
a higher, horizontal surface composed of ceramic tiles. These two surfaces are
separated by a vertical transition piece, or threshold, that arises from the lower
surface to the higher surface at a 90 degree angle. Most of the vertical transition
piece is covered by a brown strip. But above the brown strip is an exposed edge
of ceramic tile about a quarter of an inch in height. This ceramic tile extends
slightly beyond the vertical surface of the transition piece leaving a small crevice
or lip.

Id.
156. Id. at 179, 674 S.E.2d at 49.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 179-80, 674 S.E.2d at 49.
159. Id. at 180, 674 S.E.2d at 50.

160. Id. at 182, 674 S.E.2d at 51.
161.

Id. (emphasis added).

162. Id.
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The decision in American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown" raises the
intriguing question of under what circumstances a sign designed to warn
invitees of a hazardous condition may, in fact, become a hazard itself.
In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. an employee of the defendant movie
theater noticed a drink spilled outside one of the theater's auditoriums.' " The employee diligently cleaned up the spill and, as an
additional precaution and in accordance with the theater's standard
procedures, placed "a commonplace, A-frame '[wiet [filoor' sign ... [ten]
The plaintiff, a
to [twenty] paces outside the auditorium door.""
patron at the theater, exited the auditorium at the conclusion of the
movie. The plaintiff did not see the "wet floor" sign because of the crowd
and tripped over the sign, which apparently had fallen flat. The plaintiff
subsequently brought suit against the defendant. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff
appealed." On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal.16 7
The court of appeals relied on its 2002 decision in Warberg v. Saint
Louis Bread Co.1" and its 2006 decision in Freeman v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc."6 The Warberg decision, relied upon by the trial court in
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, involved a
patron at a mall who slipped on a collapsed "wet floor" sign similar to
the sign in the present case. 7 ° The plaintiff in Freeman suffered an
injury when she fell over a rolled-up mat that had fallen across an aisle
in a Wal-Mart store.171 In adopting the defendant's reading of War-

163. 285 Ga. 442, 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009), affg 292 Ga. App. 505, 664 S.E.2d 838 (2008).
164. Id. at 442, 679 S.E.2d at 26-27.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 442-43, 679 S.E.2d at 26-27.
167. Id. at 443-44, 448, 679 S.E.2d at 27, 30.
168. 255 Ga. App. 352, 565 S.E.2d 561 (2002).
169. 281 Ga. App. 132,635 S.E.2d 399 (2006); seeAmerican Multi-Cinema,Inc., 285 Ga.
at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 27.
170. 255 Ga. App. at 352-53, 565 S.E.2d at 562. In Warberg the plaintiff went to the
defendant's bakery to purchase bagels. As she walked to the bakery counter, the plaintiff
"stepped on a plastic 'wet floor' sign that was folded over and lying flat on the floor, rather
than in its proper upright position." Id. According to the plaintiff in Warberg, 'the sign
'scooted' out from under [the plaintiff], her foot slid forward with the sign, and she fell on
her back." Id. at 353, 565 S.E.2d at 562.
171. 281 Ga. App. at 133, 635 S.E.2d at 400. About fifteen minutes before the plaintiff
in Freeman fell, an employee of the defendant "had inspected the area and had seen the
rolled-up mat leaning in a corner against a produce shelf, but did not remove it because
he did not consider it to be in anyone's way." The employee did not know that the mat fell
across the aisle after his inspection. Id. The court of appeals held that there was "some
evidence from which a jury could foresee that the rolled-up mat would be knocked over and
become a tripping hazard." Id. at 136, 635 S.E.2d at 402.
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berg and Freeman,the trial court agreed with the defendant's arguments
that
(1) ... the sign [was] initially set up correctly; (2) the [plaintiff]
produced no evidence that [the defendant] knew the sign had fallen
down before [the plaintiff] tripped on it; and (3) the [Georgial court of
appeals held in Walberg... and Freeman... that a "[w]et [lloor" sign
is not a tripping hazard as long as it was set up properly even if it is
lying flat on the floor by the time the plaintiff reaches it, even if it was
placed in a highly trafficked area, and even if the defendant knew that
signs of this type frequently end up falling over when they come into
contact with moving crowds.172
The plaintiff, however, argued that the trial court erred in its application
of the Warberg and Freeman decisions.17 3 In affirming the court of
appeals decision, the supreme court relied on its decision in Robinson v.
Kroger.74
'" The court noted that after Robinson, "to survive a motion
for summary judgment, a plaintiff must come forward with evidence
that, viewed in the most favorable light, would enable a rational trier of
fact to find that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of
the hazard."175 Because the plaintiff presented evidence that the type
of sign used by the defendant was prone to collapse when in contact with
moving crowds, creating a tripping hazard, the supreme court could not
hold as a matter of law that the defendant "fulfilled its legal duty to
avoid76 creating an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to the pub"1
lic.

In Vega v. La Movida, Inc.,177 the plaintiffs filed suit after being shot
inside a bar owned by the defendant. 7 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant "failed to provide adequate security inside the bar."179 At
trial, however, the jury found in favor of the defendant. An appeal
ensued. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the trial court
had improperly excluded evidence of prior criminal activity near the

172. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 285 Ga. at 443, 679 S.E.2d at 27.
173. See id.
174.

268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).

175. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 285 Ga. at 444-45, 679 S.E.2d at 28.
176. Id. at 446, 679 S.E.2d at 29. The court stated that if the plaintiff's theory-that
the use of the sign in a heavily trafficked area was itself a risk of foreseeable harm-is

viable, then the defendant had actual knowledge of the hazard when the sign was set-up.
Id.
177. 294 Ga. App. 311, 670 S.E.2d 116 (2008).
178. Id. at 311, 670 S.E.2d at 118.
179. Id.
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bar."s The court of appeals, however, rejected the plaintiffs' argument. 81
The court of appeals noted that as 1the
Georgia Supreme Court held in
82
Sturbridge Partners,Ltd. v. Walker,

a proprietor's duty to exercise ordinary care to protect invitees against
third-party criminal attacks "extends only to foreseeable criminal acts,"

that is, acts which the proprietor had "reason to anticipate." "Accordingly, the incident causing the injury must be substantially similar in
type to the previous criminal activities occurring on or near the
premises so that a reasonable person would take ordinary precautions
to protect his or her customers... against the risk posed by that type
of activity."'8

The plaintiffs alleged that the trial court had improperly excluded
evidence of fifteen prior crimes. One of the crimes excluded by the trial
judge was a theft that had occurred inside the bar." The remaining
fourteen crimes had all occurred outside the bar, "either in the parking
lot or in the general neighborhood."'85 The trial court had excluded
evidence of these crimes on the basis that they were not substantially
similar to the incident giving rise to the plaintiffs' injuries.'
The
court of appeals agreed.'87 With respect to the prior theft inside the
bar, the court of appeals held that "this crime against property did not
give the proprietor notice sufficient to call his attention to the danger of
violent crime inside the bar."" With respect to the crimes outside the
bar,"8' 9 the court of appeals noted that "evidence of crimes occurring in
the parking lot did not show that [the defendant] was on notice that, in

180. Id.

181. Id.
182. 267 Ga. 785, 482 S.E.2d 339 (1997).
183. Vega, 294 Ga. App. at 312, 670 S.E.2d at 119 (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Sturbridge,267 Ga. at 786, 482 S.E.2d at 340-41).

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 313, 670 S.E.2d at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The crimes included

two carjackings; one kidnapping/car theft; one car theft; one stabbing, beating, and
aggravated assault with a knife, probably gang-related; one armed robbery at
gunpoint; two hit-and-run incidents; one driving under the influence, in which a
person was dragged in the parking lot; one person seen brandishing a firearm; and
four instances of gunshots fired in or near the parking lot.

Id. at 314 n.12, 670 S.E.2d at 120 n.12.
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spite of its efforts to put security precautions in place at the entrance to
its bar, a dangerous condition existed inside the bar.""9
In another case arising from an altercation in a bar, the court of
appeals in Mulligan's Bar & Grill v. Stanfield 9 ' affirmed a jury
verdict in favor of a patron who was injured "when a beer bottle struck
him in the face during a fight between two of [the defendant's] other patrons."92 The evidence established that the two patrons involved in
the fight had caused problems throughout the evening, that both of the
patrons involved in the fight had previously been banned from the bar
for fighting, and that several of the defendant's employees were "aware
of the bottle-throwing patron's presence at the bar and his demonstrably
combative behavior beginning as early as three hours before [the
plaintiff] sustained his injury.""9' In addition, there was evidence that
the defendant had received complaints of inadequate security from his
own employees prior to the incident but took no action to address the
concerns. After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
appealed." 9 At the heart of the defendant's appeal was the contention
that Georgia's Dram Shop Act 96 barred the plaintiff's claims. The
defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its
motion for a directed verdict on this issue. 96
The court of appeals noted that "[u]nder the Act, 'the consumption of
alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of such
beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury ... inflicted by an
intoxicated person upon himself or upon another person.'"' 97 The court
of appeals, however, rejected the defendant's "attempt to transform this
matter into a 'liquor liability' case." 98 The court noted that it was
clear from the plaintiff's complaint and the other pleadings in the case
that the case was "grounded in established Georgia premises liability
law." ' In this regard, the court noted that the plaintiff had clearly
pled and attempted to prove that the defendant had inadequately
secured its premises. 2°° As the court of appeals noted, "the Georgia
Dram Shop Act was never intended to and does not pertain to premises

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 314, 670 S.E.2d at 120.
294 Ga. App. 250, 668 S.E.2d 874 (2008).
Id. at 250, 668 S.E.2d at 874.
Id. at 250-51, 668 S.E.2d at 875.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000).

196.

Stanfield, 294 Ga. App. at 251, 668 S.E.2d at 875.

197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(a)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251-52, 668 S.E.2d at 875.
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liability claims like the one before this Court."2"' The court of appeals,
therefore, held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's
motion
for a directed verdict on the basis of the Georgia Dram Shop
2

Act.

20

VI.

LIABILrTY FOR ANIMAL ATTACKS
In Custer v. Coward, °3 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the

grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant in a civil action
arising from a dog bite.'
The plaintiffs' five-year-old daughter was
playing on a trampoline at a neighbors' house when she fell off the
trampoline and onto the neighbor's dog, Butkus. Butkus responded,
perhaps not unexpectedly, by biting the plaintiffs' daughter. The
plaintiffs brought suit against their neighbors. The trial court granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs
appealed.2 "5
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued
that the trial court erred in (1) holding that the dog's prior act of

aggression did not place the [defendants] on notice of the likelihood
that the dog would bite someone; [and] (2) finding that the [defendants]
could not be liable because the dog had not actually bitten someone
before the incident in question.'
The plaintiffs presented evidence that the dog had previously growled
and barked on several prior occasions, although there was no evidence
that the dog had actually bitten anyone. In addition, the plaintiffs
submitted evidence that the dog suffered from a spinal nerve condition
that, according to the plaintiffs, could cause the dog to develop an
aggression problem. 207 The court of appeals, however, rejected the
plaintiffs' contentions.20 8 The court noted that "to prevail on their
claim, the [plaintiffs] were required to show that Butkus had the
propensity to bite and that the [defendants] had knowledge of that
propensity."2 °9 Further, "'the true test of liability is the owner's

201. Id. at 252, 668 S.E.2d at 875.
202. Id. at 253, 668 S.E.2d at 876.

203.

293 Ga. App. 316, 667 S.E.2d 135 (2008).

204. Id. at 320, 667 S.E.2d at 138.

205. Id. at 316-17, 667 S.E.2d at 136.
206. Id. at 316, 667 S.E.2d at 136.
207. Id. at 317-19, 667 S.E.2d at 137-38.
208. Id. at 319, 667 S.E.2d at 138.
209. Id. at 318, 667 S.E.2d at 137.
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superior knowledge of his dog's temperament.'"21 ' The court rejected
the argument that prior occasions on which the dog growled placed the
defendants on notice of a propensity for the dog to bite.2 n Moreover,
the court held that there was no evidence that the dog's nerve condition
"would make it more likely to attack humans."2 2
The plaintiffs further argued on appeal that the trial court erred in
rejecting their premises liability claim.213 The court of appeals,
however, noted that
[in a typical dog bite case, regardless of whether the cause of action is
based on the premises liability statute ([O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1214]) or the
dangerous animal liability statute ([O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7215]) a plaintiff
must produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in order to
show that
the owner of the premises had superior knowledge of the
216
danger.

Because the plaintiffs had failed to do so, the court of appeals affirmed
the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.217
In another court of appeals case, Huff v. Dyer,218 the defendants had
chained their dog in the back of their pickup truck while they enjoyed
breakfast at a local restaurant. The plaintiff, who regularly ate at the
same restaurant and had seen the defendants' dog on several prior
occasions, approached the dog and, apparently believing the dog wanted
to lick her face, leaned in toward the dog's face. The dog bit the plaintiff
in the face. The plaintiff sued the defendants. The plaintiff submitted
evidence that the dog had previously barked at another patron of the
restaurant while chained in the back of the defendants' pickup truck.
After a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, the plaintiff appealed the
denial of her motions for directed verdict.219 The court of appeals,
however, affirmed the trial court's denial of the motions.220
On appeal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in
denying her motion for directed verdict as to the dog's alleged dangerous
210. Id. at 319, 667 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting Raith v. Blanchard, 271 Ga. App. 723, 724,
611 S.E.2d 75, 77 (2005)).
211. Id.
212. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 138.
213. Id.
214. O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (2000).
215. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (2000).
216. Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319,667 S.E.2d at 138 (quoting Osowski v. Smith, 262 Ga.
App. 538, 539-40, 586 S.E.2d 71, 73 (2003)).
217. Id.
218. 297 Ga. App. 761, 678 S.E.2d 206 (2009).
219. Id. at 761-62, 678 S.E.2d at 207-08.
220. Id. at 761, 678 S.E.2d at 207.
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Section 51-2-7 of the O.C.G.A.

A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind
and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at
liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the
injury by his own act may be liable in damages to the person so
injured. In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show
that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an
ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said
animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash.'
The plaintiff argued that she had "satisfied the second sentence of
[O.C.G.A.] § 51-2-7 by producing evidence that the [defendants'] dog was
in violation of a Hall County Animal Control Ordinance."2" The court
of appeals, however, disagreed.224

The court held that O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 "relieves a plaintiff from
producing evidence of a dog's vicious propensity based on evidence of a
violation of an ordinance that restricts dogs from running at large."2 5
The court of appeals noted that the local ordinance "does not protect
people who approach restrained animals, regardless of whether the
animal is at heel, on a leash, or restrained in the bed of a truck."226
Because the defendants' dog was restrained in the back of the pickup,
the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying the
plaintiff's motion for directed verdict on this issue.
The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants had knowledge of the
dog's vicious propensity.22 ' But the plaintiffs evidence failed on this
point as well. 229 The court of appeals noted that "Id]espite evidence
that the dog had previously barked when a child was near the truck,
barking amounts at most to menacing" behavior and does not serve as
evidence of a dog's vicious propensity. 230

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 763, 678 S.E.2d at 208.
O.C.G.A § 51-2-7.
Huff, 297 Ga. App. at 763, 678 S.E.2d at 208.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 764, 678 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 764-65, 678 S.E.2d at 209.

228. Id. at 763, 678 S.E.2d at 208.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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FALSE IMPRISONMENT

In Shannon v. Office Max North America, Inc.,"' the plaintiff was
terminated from his employment with the defendant after making copies
of pornographic material for his personal use on one of the company's
copiers. However, prior to his termination, the plaintiff was questioned
for approximately one hour and twenty-five minutes by the store's
manager and a loss prevention officer. Subsequent to his termination,
the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for, inter alia, false
imprisonment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. 2 The Georgia Court
of Appeals affirmed.'
Section 51-7-20 of the O.C.G.A. 4 provides that "[flalse imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length
of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty." 5 As
the court of appeals noted, "'[tihe restraint used to create the detention
must be against the plaintiff's will and be accomplished by either force
or fear.'" 6 There was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff had
been physically restrained or threatened with force. 7 Rather, the
plaintiff argued "that he was threatened with the loss of his job and with
criminal prosecution," which, according to the plaintiff, caused him to be
detained against his will."
The court of appeals, however, rejected
this argument and held that "such threats do not constitute detention for
purposes of a false imprisonment claim."239
In Ferrell v. Mikula, 24° one of the defendants, an assistant manager
at a Ruby Tuesday restaurant, was informed by a waitress that two
customers had left without paying. The assistant manager exited the
restaurant and noticed a vehicle leaving the parking lot. Outside the
restaurant was an off-duty police officer hired by the restaurant to
provide security. The assistant manager informed the off-duty officer
that the people in the car had left without paying. The off-duty police
officer followed the vehicle and called the police, who stopped the vehicle.

231. 291 Ga. App. 834, 662 S.E.2d 885 (2008).
232. Id. at 834-35, 662 S.E.2d at 887-88.
233. Id. at 837, 662 S.E.2d at 889.
234. O.C.GA. § 51-7-20 (2000).
235. Id.
236. Shannon, 291 Ga. App. at 835, 662 S.E.2d at 888 (quoting Miraliakbari v.
Pennicooke, 254 Ga. App. 156, 160, 561 S.E.2d 483, 488 (2002)).
237. Id. at 836, 662 S.E.2d at 888.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
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Eighteen-year-old Racquel Ferrell was driving the vehicle stopped by the
police. Her thirteen-year-old sister was a passenger in the car. Both
Racquel and her sister were handcuffed by the police and placed in the
back of squad cars. Ferrell told the police officers that she had paid her
bill. This was true, and shortly thereafter the police learned that the
assistant manager had sent the off-duty officer after the wrong vehicle.
Ferrell and her little sister were then released. Not surprisingly, Ferrell
and her parents took exception to what occurred and brought suit
against the restaurant and the assistant manager for, among other
claims, false imprisonment. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on all counts. The trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed.2 1 The court of appeals reversed
the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claim for false
imprisonment.2 2
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court's order should
have been affirmed because (1) the assistant manager "merely stated his
good faith belief about the crime to the security guard police officer, who
then acted on his own," (2) probable cause existed for the detention, and
(3) there was no evidence that the assistant manager acted with
malice. 2'
The court of appeals, however, rejected the defendants'
arguments. 2 " As previously noted, false imprisonment is "the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby
such person is deprived of his personal liberty." "
The court of appeals observed that there was no dispute over the fact
that Ferrell and her little sister had been detained.2 "6 The court,
therefore, turned to the defendants' arguments that the assistant
manager did not act with malice and that probable cause existed for the
detention.2' 7 Contrary to the defendants' argument, the court of
appeals noted that "malice is not an element of false imprisonment, only
of malicious arrest and prosecution under"24" O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1249
and O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40. 250 With respect to the defendants' argument
that probable cause existed for the detention, the court held that "'the
mere existence of probable cause standing alone has no real defensive

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 326-28, 672 S.E.2d at 9-10.
Id. at 326, 672 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 329, 672 S.E.2d at 10-11.
Id. at 329-30, 672 S.E.2d at 11.
O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20.
Ferrell, 295 Ga. App. at 329, 672 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G. § 51-7-1 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40 (2000).
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bearing on the issue of liability.' 1 Further, the court stated that
"[glenerally, one 'who causes or directs the arrest of another by an officer
without a warrant may be held liable for false imprisonment, in the
absence of justification, and the burden of proving that such imprisonment lies within an exception rests upon the person ... causing the
imprisonment. ' " "
The defendants, however, failed to meet this
burden.'
The court of appeals next addressed the defendants' contention that
the assistant manager did not cause the arrest because the off-duty
police officer acted on his own accord." 4 In this regard, the court of
appeals noted that "[wihether a party is potentially liable for false
imprisonment by 'directly or indirectly urg[ing] a law enforcement
official to begin criminal proceedings' or is not liable because he 'merely
relates facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to
arrest' is a factual question for the jury."" The issue is not whether
the defendant actually demanded the arrest; rather, the issue is whether
256
the defendant's "conduct and acts 'procured and directed the arrest.'"
In the case sub judice, the assistant manager
told the officer that the car leaving the parking lot contained people
who left without paying for their food, although he did not know or try
to ascertain who was in the car. He also knew the officer was going to
detain the people in the
car and could have tried to stop him, but made
7
no attempt to do so.2

The court of appeals, therefore, concluded that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim.258

251. Ferrell,295 Ga. App. at 329, 672 S.E.2d at 11 (quoting Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga.
App. 317, 318, 306 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1983)).
252. Id. at 330, 672 S.E.2d at 11 (ellipses in original) (quoting Scott Hous. Sys. v.
Hickox, 174 Ga. App. 23, 24, 329 S.E.2d 154, 155 (1985)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Scott Hous. Sys., 174 Ga. App. at 25,
329 S.E.2d at 155).
256. Id. (quoting Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 752, 9 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1940)).
257. Id. at 331, 672 S.E.2d at 12.
258. Id.

